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I. Introduction
Conventional international relations (IR) theorists, such as realists, neofunctionalists or regime theorists, view international organizations (IOs) as passive tools
with which to achieve certain goals. Although an IO may facilitate inter-state
cooperation and reduce transaction costs, it does not have a life of its own.1 Therefore,
conventional IR theorists focus mostly on the creation of an IO and inter-state
cooperation leading up to the creation. As a result, an IO’s institutional change remains
rather an “under-studied” and “under-theorized” issue in the conventional international
relations (IR) framework.2
Granted, conventional IR theories may provide useful insights on an inter-national
dynamic among creators (states) of an IO. Many scholars have attempted to explain, and
justify, such a dynamic through varying theoretical lenses, such as neo-realism and neoliberalism. Nonetheless, they seldom offer a satisfactory explanation on an institutional
dynamic under which an IO, as a separate and autonomous organic entity, grows, evolves
and eventually makes sense of its own existence. By focusing on an IO’s autonomy, we
can expect to capture the dynamic operation, or evolution, of a specific IO qua
organization, predict its future trajectory and even launch various reform agenda through
an identification of specific conditions under which specific IOs can perform effectively in
specific stages of their institutional development.3
Therefore, this paradigm shift in perceiving an IO from a passive, inorganic tool to
an autonomous, organic entity provides us with a theoretical foundation under which we
can delve into a unique and case-specific institutional development of an IO. We often
label, classify and identify some international organizations as a “trade” organization and
some others as an “environmental” organization. Then, what makes a certain organization
a trade organization, and some other an environmental organization? Among other things,
the “purpose” of an organization tends to determine its identity. A trade organization is so
named because it pursues free trade, and an environmental organization is so labeled
because it aims for environmental protection.
Yet, the formation of an IO’s purpose, and thus identity, is not a static event. Like
a human individual, such a formation is subject to a certain developmental process over a
period of time. In developmental psychology, a person’s identity is formed (“identity
formation”) after it suffers from a certain crisis (“identity crisis”). As one grows old, she
experiences an ever-broadening horizon in her surroundings and face her “historical
moments” in which she agonizes over what she lives for and what she should become.
1

Ness & Brechin, 246; Harold K. Jacobson et al., National Entanglements and International Government
Organizations, 80 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 141-59 (1986).
2
Helfer 655
3
See Ness & Brechin, 271
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Only after such an identity crisis can her true identity be formed and the purpose of her
life established.
This identity theory in developmental psychology enlightens the institutional
development of an IO. As it evolves, it interacts with its environment, and continuously
defines and redefines its institutional raison d'être. In this process, the organization often
undergoes a daunting situation under which an old structure has become increasingly
incapable of coping with new challenges from the new environment. Confronting this
crisis, it may reconfigure its institutional setting by adjusting its teleology to the new
environment. Only then can its institutional existence continue to hold relevance, and its
genuine institutional identity be formed.
Against this background, this Article attempts to hypothesize an IO’s institutional
development qua organization from the standpoint of identity formation. The Article also
tests the hypothesis by applying it to the World Trade Organization (WTO). Part II first
discusses a theoretical foundation of the whole analysis, i.e., the autonomy of an IO. An
IO’s identity cannot be constructed without autonomy from its members (states). The
Part adopts the views of organizational sociology, which focuses on autonomy of
organizations, unlike the conventional IR theorists who regards IOs as a mere tool of
states.
Part III then constructs a theory of identity formation of IOs. The Part first
delineates various parameters of identity formation, such as history, the environment,
goals and technology. It then observes that the process of identity formation is a
normative one which is operated by rules and legal discourse. Part IV applies this theory
of identity formation to the WTO. The Part demonstrates how the GATT’s old
identification with a narrow meaning of trade embraced new external challenges on nontrade values, such as protection of the environment and human health. It argues that the
WTO’s identity formation is to strike an institutional equilibrium between traditional
trade values and these non-trade values. Part V concludes.
II. The Origin of Identity of International Organizations: Autonomy of International
Organizations

A. Two Theoretical Perspectives on International Organizations

1. International Organizations as Inorganic Entities: Empty Shells
Conventional international relations (IR) theorists, such as realists or regime
theorists, regard IOs as mere passive machinery, or “empty shells,” of interstate
cooperation; from a functionalist standpoint, these theorists view that sovereign states

2
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create and operate IOs for a better world system by “enmeshing” them in mutually
beneficial economic transactions.4 As Robert Keohane aptly observed, this “rationalistic”
approach only highlights IOs’ functional merits, such as reducing uncertainty and
transaction costs, in the absence of any specific institutional context.5 Neo-liberals,
though they recognize that IOs can change states’ behaviors, still do not accord IOs
autonomy.6 Lawrence Helfer aptly observed that:
“[F]or most scholars, the story of IOs ends where it ought to begin – with their
founding. What these institutions do once they have been created remains underexamined and under-theorized.”7
While “identify[ing] hypotheses about IO change” may be inferred from a
conventional theoretical baggage centering on why and how states create IOs,8 those
hypotheses nonetheless remain unsatisfactory since an institutional change itself tends to
be at odds with conventional IR theories. Change is either “assumed away”9 or thrust
upon IOs by their creators, i.e., states, in accordance with changes in national interests or
state preferences.10 Therefore, change is nothing but a re-creation of IOs due to
asymmetrical external shocks, such as disasters,11 rather than an evolution or adaptation
due to continuous, incremental institutional development. From this perspective, to study
how IOs work and change is basically to understand international cooperation among
states.12
2. International Organizations as Organic Entities: A Life of Their Own
The abovementioned inorganic approach to IOs by conventional IR theorists
leaves little room for organizational autonomy-cum-identity since it basically views IOs as
static instruments for states’ collective purposes. They are nothing but nuts and bolts, and
nuts and bolts have no special names. Accordingly, “few have noted that organizations
differ over time, or that they perform differently from one another, or that they achieve
their ends with varying effectiveness or efficiency.”13

4

Ness & Brechin, 246; Harold K. Jacobson et al., National Entanglements and International Government
Organizations, 80 Am. Pol. Sci. Rev. 141-59 (1986).
5
Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 Int’l Stud. Q. 379, 390 (1988).
6
Barnett & Finnemore, 704-05.
7
Helfer, 658
8
Helfer,
9
Helfer, 661; Ira Katznelson & Barry R. Weingast, Intersections between Historical and Rational Choice
Institutionalism, in Preferences and Situations: Points of Intersection between Historical and Rational
Choice Institutionalism 1, 7 (Ira Katznelson & Barry R. Weingast eds., 2005).
10
Helfer, 661
11
Id., at 662.
12
See Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions: Two Approaches, 32 Int’l Stud. Q. 379, 379 (1988).
13
Ness & Brechin, 247
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In contrast, sociological approaches enable a theoretical emancipation of IOs from
their creators (states). IOs are “live collectivities” interrelating with the environment.14
According to the Weberian bureaucracy theory and sociological institutionalist
approaches, the “rational-legal” authority which the bureaucracy of IOs generates
endogenously claims an independent status separate from their actors (states).15 Here,
bureaucracy is defined as an internal mechanism of IOs which creates norms and social
knowledge.16 These approaches focus on the “social content” of the organization, i.e., “its
culture, its legitimacy concerns, dominant norms that govern behavior and shape interests,
and the relationship of these to a larger normative and cultural environment.”17
Yet, IOs’ autonomy gains more theoretical salience in the “natural” system
perspective than the Weberian “rational” system perspective. While Weber highlights the
rational-legal authority of bureaucracy, this authority is still instrumental in that it is
“blue-printed” to achieve rationally pre-deliberated and pre-programmed goals.18 In
contrast, the “natural” system perspective views an organization, beyond mere tools to
attain pre-determined goals, as “social groups attempting to adapt and survive in their
particular circumstances.”19 Therefore, organizations are capable of modifying their
original goals to survive in the changing environment. They become “ends in
themselves.”20
Philip Selznick’s “institutional” approach perfects this theory of organizational
autonomy. Institutionalization distinguishes organizations from a mere cybernetic
machinery which passively channels states’ inputs. Selznick defines institutionalization as
“the emergence of orderly, stable, socially integrating patterns out of unstable, loosely
organized, or narrowly technical activities.”21 Through the process of institutionalization,
an organization obtains both special capacity and character,22 and establishes its value.23
Those who argue for IO’s autonomy debunk the conventional view that IOs are a
mere passive machinery of states from an empirical standpoint.24 They adduce empirical
confirmations for an independent bureaucracy in IOs (such as “eurocrats” in the
European Union)25 or an independent organizational culture and agenda-setting (such as
the World Bank).26

14

Ness & Brechin, 247
Barnett & Finnemore, 699
16
Id. Bureaucracy, broader than the secretariat; criticism often directed to the bureaucracy
17
Barnett & Finnemore, 706
18
Scott 53; Gouldner (1959: 404-05)
19
Scott 57
20
Id.
21
Broom & Selznick, 1955:238
22
Selznick 1996
23
Selznick 1957, 17
24
Barnett & Finnemore, 705
25
Pollack 1997
26
Wade 1996
15
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B. A Case for Organizational Autonomy

1. Legal Personality
Public international law confirms and manifests IOs’ organizational autonomy
through the lens of their legal personality.27 IOs can be a legal subject of rights and
obligations under their own legal capacity, independently from their members (states). By
holding legal personality, an IO claims “a life apart from the will of the individual states
which formed the membership of the organization.”28
Article 104 of the United Nations Charter stipulates that “the Organization shall
enjoy in the territory of each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for
the exercise of its functions and the fulfilment of its purposes.”29 Article 8:1 of the WTO
Agreement also provides that “the WTO shall have legal personality, and shall be
accorded by each of its Members such legal capacity as may be necessary for the exercise
of its functions.”30 The International Court of Justice (ICJ) even ruled in the Reparation
case that an IO holds the capacity to sue a state, regardless of its membership to the
organization, for damage caused by a violation by the state of its obligation toward the
organization.31 The International Law Commission (ILO) is also working to create a draft
governing legal responsibility for damage which an IO may cause to states or other IOs.32
Public international law also recognizes the unique identity of each IO by
accentuating its distinctive functional mandate or competence. For example, the ICJ
rejected the World Health Organization (WHO)’s request to the court to deliver an
advisory opinion as to whether states’ use of nuclear weapons violate international law on
the ground that such issue did not fall within the rubric of the WHO’s activities.33 This
decision insinuates a distinguishable mission of each IO which tends to justify
organizational autonomy and identity.
2. Evaluation

27

But see Giuseppe Marchegiano, The Juristic Character of the International Commission of the Cape
Spartel Lighthouse, 25 Am. J. Int’l L. 339, 339 (1931) (finding the notion of international personalities as
debatable).
28
David J. Bederman, The Souls of International Organizations: Legal Personality and the Lighthouse at
Cape Spartel, 36 Va. J. Int’l L. 275, 277 (1995-1996).
29
UN Charter, art. 104
30
WTO Charter, art. VIII:1.
31 Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations [1949] ICJ Rep 174, at 179,
available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions/isummaries/iisunsummary490411.htm.
32
ILC, http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/guide/9_11.htm.
33
The Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, 1 ICJ Rep. 226 [1996].
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Under the classical realism and its logical corollary, instrumental functionalism,
which is represented by David Mitrany, an international organization is a mere tool of
sovereign countries and thus quite dependent on the sovereign will. As mere instruments,
like nuts and bolts, realists largely fail to pay attention to the unique characteristics that
are deeply associated with each organization’s autonomy and identity. Therefore, they
tend to treat even effective IOs the same as “those that are near moribund.”34 To them,
nuts are nuts and bolts bolts; some are not superior to others.
However, sociology opens a theoretical possibility with which to study an
organization qua organization, not merely as an instrument of its creators, i.e.,
governments. Under this sociological paradigm, an organization may have a life of its own
beyond its creators’ original intent and expand its teleological horizon.35 Focusing on the
autonomy of an individual organization means taking “variance” among IOs seriously,
including variance in their performance (such as effectiveness or efficiency) as well as
variables influencing such performance (such as environments).36 In particular, the
“environmental changes produced changes in organizational structure and behavior.”37
Admittedly, the “regime” theory, an adaptation from realism, also focuses on
“specific” institutions in which states routinely cooperate over certain issues in order to
reduce uncertainty and transaction costs, provide information, and stabilize expectations,
even in the absence of “hierarchical authority.”38 Critically, however, this sector-specific
regime still remains a cooperative relationship among sovereign states – no matter how
strong their cooperation may be – not an independent organization.39 As a corollary, the
regime theory fails to address two important organizational issues. First, it cannot fully
explain an organic interaction between IOs and the environment. Second, it cannot
evaluate whether each regime is legitimate and/or effective qua organization since all the
performance of the regime is logically attributable to states.
In fact, the notion of organizational autonomy parallels the way in which people
perceive IOs. While people may criticize the WTO for its various deficiencies as an
organization, they seldom criticize its members, especially big ones, such as the United
States and the European Union for those deficiencies. This is why organizational
autonomy may offer a deeper theoretical underpinning for a constitutional analysis of IOs
than positivistic framework which the regime theory provides.
III. The Theory of Identity Formation in International Organizations

34

Ness & Brechin, 247
Ness & Brechin, 246-47
36
Ness & Brechin, 248
37
Ness & Brechin, 254
38
Keohane, 386
39
Cite!
35
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A. Toward an Identity-Oriented Approach to International Organizations

1. The Identity Theory in Developmental Psychology
A pre-eminent developmental psychologist, Erik Erikson, suggests that a human
being develops her (ego) identity by combining her understanding of the environment
(group identity) and her own personal characters (personal identity).40 In other words, a
person’s identity is “constituted by a configuration of central traits … that typically make
a systematic difference to the course of a person’s life, to the habit-forming and actionguiding social categories in which she is placed, to the way that she acts, reacts, and
interacts.”41
Erikson’s theory of identity-formation focuses on the resolution of certain “crises”
that occur in each stage of development, which signify certain “conflicts” between
“identification” with the environment (such as parents and peers) and emancipation
therefrom.42 A child is “deeply and exclusively ‘identified’ with his parents.”43 Yet,
adolescents “are sometimes morbidly, often curiously, preoccupied with what they appear
to be in the eyes of others.”44 Erikson depicted the estrangement of this process as
“identity confusion.”45 The final identity, although it includes all significant
identifications with key figures of the past, also processes them in a way which builds a
unique yet still coherent whole.46 Yet, during the final stage of identity formation,
adolescents tend to suffer greatly from role confusion.47 Past multiple identifications, and
the roles which they prescribe, often conflict with each other. This disturbance is
tantamount to a crisis or “a war within themselves.”48 Only after adolescents weather this
Strum und Drang do they acquire a sense of “knowing where [they are] going.”49
However, some adolescents fail to undergo this identity crisis and demonstrate a
pathological symptom, i.e., “a loss of center and a dispersion,” which is characterized as
“identity diffusion.”50 According to Marcia, identity diffusion arises when adolescents
make no commitments, or show no fidelity, to their identity as they experience no

40

Erik H. Erikson, Identity, Youth and Crisis (1968). See also Willem L. Wardekker, Identity, Plurality, and
Education, Philosophy of Education (1995)
41
A.O. Rorty & D. Wong, Aspects of Identity and Agency, in Identity, Character, and Morality: Essays in
Moral Psychology 19 (O. Flanagan & A.O. Rorty ed. 1990).
42
G. Emerson Dickman, Adopted Child Status, Identity, and Behavior
43
Erikson (1968: 115)
44
Id., at 128.
45
Id/, at 131.
46
Id., at 161; Dickman
47
Id., at 163-64.
48
Id., at 17.
49
Id., at 165.
50
Id., at 212.
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identity crisis.51 Other problematic identity statuses are “foreclosure,” in which
adolescents have already made commitments to a certain identity without exploring
various identities, and “moratorium,” in which adolescents merely engage in such
exploration without making any commitments.52
2. Applying the Identity Theory to International Organizations
The organic images of organizations to which natural system theorists subscribe
tend to justify cross-fertilization between human science, such as medical biology and
psychology, and organizational sociology. Like a human body, an organization pursues a
homeostatic equilibrium.53 Such equilibrium is also necessary in human psychological
development as a person grows and become mature mentally. This notion of equilibrium,
or balance, is critical in the process of identity formation. As an organic entity, an
organization also pursues such equilibrium vis-à-vis the external environment as it builds
and adapts its individuality in its institutional development.
Another commonality between a human and an organization tends to support the
organizational theory’s interdisciplinary cooptation of human science, such as psychology.
Unlike a closed system, such as a “cybernetic” system, in which inputs from the
environment can never change internal elements of an organization, both humans and
organizations are “open systems” which are “capable of self-maintenance on the basis of
throughput of resources from the environment.”54 The shift from closed to open systems
highlights the critical significance which the environment exerts on organizational
identity,55 as it does on the human identity.
In fact, some organization theorists have already devoted their attention to certain
self-conceptions held by the organization’s participants in the name of “organizational
identity,” which is defined as a “central, enduring, and distinctive” set of values “that
distinguishes the organization from others with which it might be compared.”56 This
notion of organizational identity may be transported to IOs in observing and analyzing the
transformation of their institutional goals and structure as IOs continuously interact with
the environment and adapt themselves to survive.
B. The Identity Formation in International Organizations

51

Marcia, J. E. (1966) Development and validation of ego identity statuses. Journal of Personality and Social
Psychology, 3, 551-558.
52
Id.
53
Scott 60
54
Scott 89; Buckley (1967:50).
55
Ness & Brechin, 249
56
Albert & Whetten (1985: 265).
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1. Parameters of Identity Formation

a. History
The history of organizations renders an initial influence on their identities. As the
internalized past, the history tends to determine, or at least co-relate with, the present
and future behavior of organizations by defining and shaping the rationale and character
of organizations. Like DNA in the human body, organizational history bestows upon
organizations a certain institutional heredity, which establishes a unique path-dependence
for each organization. Critically, organizational history is often used as an interpretive
criteria with which to determine whether organizations’ or their participants’ behaviors
are permitted or prohibited in accordance with their charters or constitutions.57
Likewise, organizations cannot be simply discarded or disposed of even if they
subsequently become obsolete or ineffective.58 Purging old institutions and restarting
afresh new ones might be quite costly and therefore all institutional changes tend to be
path-dependent. “If sunk costs make a traditional pattern of action cheaper, and if new
patterns are not enough more profitable to justify throwing away the resource, the sunk
costs tend to preserve a pattern of action from one year to the next.”59 Old habits die hard.
Relics of the old structure or culture remain, even though they may be encapsulated
within a new institutional coating.
However, this perspective on organizational history need not be static. Perhaps to
conventional IR theorists who emphasize the genesis, rather than the subsequent change,
of IOs, organizational history is nothing but a reflection, or a repository, of interests and
preferences of states at the time when they created them. As a tool of these states with
which to achieve certain goals, organizations are supposed to implement institutional
blueprints which were programmed in history. (Diagram A) In contrast, organizational
sociologists and/or historical institutionalists view organizational history as a dynamic
factor which embodies “critical junctures” in the organizational development.60 These
critical historical moments can trigger an irreversible path-dependence that is quite
different from one that was pre-ordained by states.61 (Diagram B) Such a new historymaking process continuously and cumulatively forms an identity of organizations.
(Diagram C).

57
58

Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties
Cite!

59
60

Pierson, Paul (2004) Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis; Thelen, Kathleen (1999)
“Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics.” Annual Review of Political Science. Vol. 2, pp. 369-404
61
Pierson, Paul & Skocpol, Theda. 2002. “Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science”, in
Ira Katznelson & Helen V. Milner (eds). Political Science: State of the Discipline. New York: W.W.
Norton: 693-721
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States

States
IO

IO
IO

Diagram A

Diagram B

S

Diagram C

In sum, advocates for IOs’ autonomy envisage a seamless continuum in the IO’s
evolution that is characterized by certain critical junctures, or in a more normative sense,
“constitutional moments.” 62 The unique culture, structure and path-dependency of each
IO beget also a unique institutional arrangement, such as inter-governmental or
supranational, which tends to mark and define an IO’s identity.
b. Environment
The environment is a critical parameter to an organizational identity. If one
regards an IO as a closed system, a mere tool for states, as conventional IR theorists do,
the environment may not matter much since an IO is only supposed to take what states
provide (input) and produce pre-programmed results (output). However, organizational
sociologists have long adhered to an open system where varying environments exert
critical impact on how organizations behave and perform.63 This incessant process of
challenge and response between an IO and the environment builds up its unique identity.
An IO processes complex information provided by the environment and forms its identity
in accordance with the messages contained in those challenges.64 In this sense, the
identity-formation process of an IO is an unremitting dialogue with the environment.
The environment provides IOs with both challenges and opportunities. It forces
IOs to change their identifications with the old self mostly embedded in the charter.65 It
redefines the old self, which has lost practicality and effectiveness, as obsolescence and
62

Helfer 662, n. 45.
Howard Aldrich, Organizations and Environments (1979) (cited in Gayl D. Ness; Steven R. Brechin,
Bridging the Gap: International Organizations as Organizations, 42 Int’l Org. 245, 249 (1988)).
64
Yash P. Gupta & David C.W. Chin, Organizational Life Cycle: A Review and Proposed Directions for
Research, 30 Mid-Atlantic J. Bus. 15 (1994); Galbraith 1973.
65
Ibrahim F.I. Shihata, The Dynamic Evolution of International Organizations:
The Case of the World Bank, 2 J. His. Int’l L. 217, 218 (2000).
63
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desuetude.66 From an economic perspective, this identity-formation process is a function
of altered opportunity costs in response to environmental changes.67
c. Objective and Purpose
An IO’s objective and purpose is the rationale of its existence. Initially, it is given
by an IO’s creators (states) and engraved in its charter. Yet, as an IO forms/modifies its
identity through dynamic (historical) development it also alters, or at least fine-tunes, its
objective and purpose. In other words, organizational goals must be dynamic and
modifiable for organizations to survive.68
Importantly, these goals are inseparable from an IO’s identity because they are
both “cultural-cognitive and normative.”69 They shape an IO’s identity since they steer,
regulate and control an IO’s activities. They also provide essential interpretive guidance
when an IO determines whether a certain action is acceptable.70 In this regard, as
Selznick noted, an organizational goal can be an “ideological weapon” with which to defy
opposition and mobilize support from the environment.71
d. Technology
An IO’s “core technology”72 refers to its functional capability to perform in order
to achieve its goals. It defines its domain and thus its identity by determining the range of
products or services it provides and the types of clients or consumers served.”73 The
International Monetary Fund (IMF)’s identity is as a financial organization since it is
capable of monitoring and regulating international financial flows. The WHO is a health
organization since it can monitor and regulate health-related matters, such as the
distribution of flu vaccines. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is a nuclear
energy organization since it can monitor and regulate nuclear energy issues, such as
peaceful use of atomic energy.
As an open system, organizations can import technology from their environment.74
When interacting with their environment, it can change the core technology by

66

Shihata, 220
Keohane (1988:390); North (1981)
68
Ness & Brechin, 264; Alvin W. Gouldner, Organizational Analysis, in Robert Merton et al., Sociology
Today (1959).
69
Scott 22
70
Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, art. 31.
71
Selznick 1949; Scott 292
72
Scott
73
Scott 126; Levine & White (1961); Ness Y Brechin 256
74
Scott 23
67
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modifying its software (skills and other social knowledge), humanware (personnel and
bureaucrats) and hardware (headquarters and sub-organizations).75
2. The Normative Nature of Identity Formation
Like adolescents do in their identity formation process, IOs also experience
certain socialization pressures from their environment and are forced to diversify their
institutional selves into multiple roles which should eventually be integrated into an
internally coherent identity.76 Naturally, identity formation is not a smooth process, for
either a human being or an IO. It may be accompanied by confusion, fatigue and stress: it
is a crisis.
For an IO, identity crisis can be translated into a normative process. As discussed
above, identity-forming organizational changes which are necessary for an IO’s survival
are teleological77 and constitutive since they confirm or redefine its organizational goals
and thus regulate behaviors of members and the organization itself.78 This teleological and
constitutive process is best captured by norms and legal discourse within an IO.
“Intersubjective” or “reflective” discourse and interaction among members, as well as
between members and the IO itself, are not only intermediated by but also generate
norms.79 Norms provide and change the syntax and grammar of an IO’s operation.
Norms and legal discourse operate the identity-forming process by using and
controlling the technology of an IO. Forming an IO’s identity means, from a normative
perspective, establishing institutional criteria of acceptable behaviors or policies which
characterize the IO. These criteria may be formulated by mobilizing its software (e.g.,
interpretation),80 hardware (e.g., committees) and humanware (e.g., experts). For
example, the identity of World Bank, a development organization, as stipulated in Article 1
of its charter (Articles of Agreement), has transformed via teleological interpretation
from an organization tackling a narrow economic well-being calculated by per capita
income to that addressing a more comprehensive welfare including socio-cultural aspects,
such as women, the environment, education, and health.81
3. Failures of Identity Formation

75

Ness & Brechin 256
Susan Harter, Self and Identity Development, in At the Threshold: The Developing Adolescent 358 (S.
Shirley Feldman & Glen R. Elliott eds. 1990).
77
Ness & Brechin, 246
78
Keohane (1988: 382)
76

79
80

See e.g., Georg Ress, “The Interpretation of the Charter”, in The Charter of the United Nations – A
Commentary 28 (Bruno Simma ed., 1994) (discussing “evolutionary dynamic interpretation”).
81
Shihata 249
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If an IO cannot survive its identity crisis, it fails to achieve its true identity. First,
in the face of challenges by the changing environment it may still remain attached to an
old identification which has been prescribed by its creators, i.e., states. This
unresponsiveness to the environment, which may be equivalent to “foreclosure” in human
psychology, eventually leads to “inefficient, self-defeating behavior.”82 Second, if an IO is
confused by multiple identifications and fails to commit itself to one coherent identity, its
identity is diffused (“identity diffusion”). Identity diffusion, as in foreclosure, is a
pathological symptom. It gravely reduces the output level of an IO. IOs may even cease to
exist due to these pathologies.83

IV. An Application of the Identity Formation Theory: A Case Study on World Trade
Organization (WTO)

A. From a Contractual Tool (GATT) to an Autonomous Organization (WTO)
As one of many chapters of a much more ambitious yet aborted International
Trade Organization (ITO), the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was
originally more of a contractual document than an organization. The GATT participants
were named contracting parties, rather than members. They created the GATT against the
background of mutually destructive protectionist trade policies in the interwar period,
which shrunk world trade by seventy percent and thus contributed to the outbreak of
World War II.84 Based on “enlightened self-interests,” contracting parties aimed to
dismantle trade barriers and achieve free trade by regularly holding tariff reduction talks
in a series of negotiation rounds which the GATT provided.
While trade negotiation was basically a reciprocal, diplomatic and political
exercise, contracting parties had to preserve the hard-won delicate balance of concessions
which each negotiation had produced. In other words, they had to maintain the values of
those concessions by prohibiting parties from introducing any measures which might
cancel off such values. Those measures should be condemned and remedies instituted to
restore the balance of concessions. Therefore, the GATT, albeit a legal document, was
basically a tool for contracting parties which were pre-occupied by the terms of bargains.
This instrumental, contractual structure of the GATT is evidenced by relics of private
(contract) law embedded in the old GATT jurisprudence. The remedial prototype of the
82
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GATT was “nullification or impairment,” which is close to the notion of injuries or
damages in the law of contract. Regardless of the consistency of the measure in question
with GATT norms, any injuries to a contracting party, i.e., the dilution of benefits of its
concession, should be remedied to preserve the balance of concession made in the
previous negotiation.85 GATT dispute panels often explored whether and how much a
defendant’s measure in question brought adverse commercial effects to the complainant.86
However, this instrumental (contractual) structure of the GATT changed as it
became more institutionalized, equipped with more software (norms and practices),
hardware (divisions and offices), and humanware (personnel). The GATT began to focus
more on the public law aspect, such as the predictability that the rule of law in this field
offers. As the former Director of the WTO Appellate Body Secretariat Debra Steger aptly
described, the GATT slowly evolved into “something greater than a contract that could
be withdrawn from by any contracting party whenever it found the obligations too
onerous.”87 In the same line, the once critical notion of “nullification or impairment” was
weakened as it was assumed away whenever a panel found a violation.88 In fact, any
violation would ipso facto constitute a nullification or impairment.89 This paradigm shift,
from a power-oriented structure focusing on the outcome of negotiation to a rule-oriented
structure valuing the legal system within the GATT, paved the ground for a critical
transformation from a contract to an organization.90 As Anne Krueger aptly observed, the
WTO’s organizational autonomy, i.e., its legal personality, tends to justify an institutional
evolution from the old GATT, which had been deemed an instrument of contracting
parties, to an independent organization.91
B. The WTO’s Identity Crisis
The legalization, or judicialization, of the GATT through its dispute settlement
system contributed greatly to its institutionalization. Its panel system functioned quite
well in resolving trade disputes between contracting parties. Critically, the GATT not
only resolved trade disputes but also generated a rich set of jurisprudence in the area of
85
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international trade law. The rule of law which the GATT established in the trade area
was the most valuable product that the GATT produced as an organization. This
legalization, or rule of law, in the trade area enabled the GATT to process information
and further build up its unique technology, i.e., trade governance. Contracting parties
increasingly relied on the GATT in acquiring information and addressing various
problems concerning trade. In sum, the GATT consolidated its identification with what it
was meant to be, i.e., a trade agreement.
However, the environment surrounding the GATT was changing dramatically in
the 1980’s and the pro-trade bias of the GATT came under attack. The rising ethos of
“welfare state” urged governments to improve social hygiene in the areas of the
environment and human health. The problem is that the proliferation of these social
regulations might potentially undermine free trade goals since trade restriction due to
regulatory heterogeneity tends to become increasingly painful in times of growing
interdependence.92 Under certain circumstances, these new domestic regulations, as nontariff barriers (NTBs), can be abused as a disguised form of protectionism.93
The GATT first defied this rising tide of (re-) regulation by striking down these
regulations as trade-restrictive. Although there existed the general exception clause
(GATT Article XX) under which these regulations might be justified, not a single
measure was ever actually justified under the clause in the GATT’s history.94 For example,
in 1990 a GATT panel struck down the Thai ban on foreign cigarettes as unnecessary
92

A number of scholars have already paid attention to this phenomenon. For instance, Sol Picciotto
observed that:
“Regulatory regimes have been brought into greater interaction as the removal of direct barriers to
the flows of goods and money between states (tariffs, quotas and exchange controls) has shifted
attention towards regulatory difference as a barrier to entry of commodities or capital.”
Sol Picciotto, The Regulatory Criss-Cross: Interaction between Jurisdictions and the Construction of Global
Regulatory Networks, in INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY COMPETITION AND COORDINATION: PERSPECTIVES
ON ECONOMIC REGULATION IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES 89 (William Bratton et al eds. 1996).
Likewise, some economists have also noted that:
“As globalization proceeds, however, it has become increasingly evident that one nation’s
economic policies can affect other countries. When nations were separated by high trade barriers
and trade flows were limited, one country could ignore another nation’s domestic economic
policies. As barriers have come down, other countries’ domestic policies have become much more
important.”
GLOBAPHOBIA: CONFRONTING FEARS ABOUT OPEN TRADE 89 (Gary Burtless et al eds. 1998). See also
Aaditya Mattoo, Discriminatory Consequences of Non-Discriminatory Standards, WTO, WTO STAFF
WORKING PAPERS, TISD-96-01, Dec. 1997, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/reser_e/wpaps_e.htm (last visited on April 19, 2001).
93
94

Robert Howse, Managing the Interface between International Trade Law and the Regulatory State: What
Lessons Should (and Should Not) Be Drawn from the Jurisprudence of the United States Dormant Commerce
Clause, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN WORLD TRADE LAW
142 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds. 2000).

15

As of March 15, 2007

trade restriction.95 In this case, the Thai government tried to protect its people from the
many identified harms from chemicals and toxins contained in foreign cigarettes by
banning those products. In fact, the World Health Organization (WHO) also endorsed
such ban. However, the panel ruled that the ban was an unjustifiable violation of the
GATT rules since the Thai government could have found less trade restrictive means
than the ban, such as the “strict, non-discriminatory labeling and ingredient disclosure
regulations.” 96 This ruling was severely criticized not only because it ignored the WHO’s
opinion but also because its prescription to the Thai government, i.e., labeling and
disclosure regulations, was both unaffordable and ineffective for a developing country like
Thailand at that time.97
Therefore, while a pro-trade bias was faithful to the GATT’s identification with a
trade agreement, such a bias continuously invited criticism from its environment, in
particular civil society and environmental organizations. The GATT’s efforts to fix this
bias and achieve its more mature identity gathered critical momentum in the launch of
the WTO. The WTO’s mission statement under the preamble of its charter emphasizes
“sustainable development.” It has become obvious that due consideration and investment
for non-trade values, such as the environment and human health, should be made within
the WTO in order to achieve any development which is sustainable. The creation of the
Trade and Environment Committee and special side agreements, such as the Agreement
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and the Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS), can be understood as the WTO’s effort to grow out of the pro-trade bias
and form a more mature and responsive identity as a “trade” organization.98
Those who advocate a formal (hard) linkage between trade and social values tend
to argue that certain “social clauses,” which include fundamental workers' rights or
minimum international labor standards, should be normatively incorporated into the
WTO system.99 Accordingly, (rich) WTO members may restrict imports from other
(poor) members if the latter’s social conditions or practices violate these social clauses.
Despite its ostensible moralistic streaks, however, these debates on hard linkage are a
manifestation of the WTO’s identity crisis. The WTO is continuously receiving demands
for these regulatory roles and is thus exposed to different role identifications with a labor
or environmental organization beyond a trade organization. Perhaps the WTO might be a
victim of its own success. The unprecedented success of the GATT/WTO regime and in
95
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particular its dispute settlement mechanism tends to attract many social issues to the
regime.100 This gravitational force from the WTO’s environment to the WTO forces it to
undertake diverse role expectations.101
Critically, however, such hard linkage, i.e., invoking trade sanctions in the name
of protecting non-trade values, such as the environment or labor protection, risks
undermining the WTO’s core values, i.e., free trade.102 In other words, the WTO risks
suffering from a form of identity diffusion under which it may not be identified as a trade
organization since it fails to achieve trade values, while at the same time it also may not
be identified as a different regulatory international organization since it also fails to
contribute significantly to the attainment of those social goals within its institutional
purview.
In general, these social standards are lower for developing countries than
developed countries simply because the former countries are poorer than the latter.103 If
the WTO, in the absence of relevant resources, such as budget and personnel, with which
to address these non-trade values, nonetheless ventures to do so by means of its antithesis,
i.e., trade restriction, it will only encroach on poor countries’ comparative advantages,
such as cheap labor, and thus generate serious tensions between rich and poor countries
without affecting the root cause of problems.104 Rich countries may even be tempted to
use these regulatory concerns as convenient excuses for raising trade barriers, as seen in
green or blue protectionism.105 Then, the WTO will perform neither a trade nor a nontrade function, and therefore its identity would be lost. This would be tantamount to
identity diffusion for the WTO.
This risk of identity diffusion might also be found in yet another linkage of “trade
and development.” During its first decade, the WTO has failed to narrow the income gap
between the rich and the poor. The least-developed countries’ marginalization from the
mainstream of the global trading system and the subsequent abject poverty in these
countries seriously questioned the rationale of the WTO.106 This development
deficiency107 drove the WTO towards yet another identification with development as it
100
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launched the Doha Development Agenda (DDA) in 2001. However, as Tomer Broude
observed, the rhetoric of the development round does not fully match the technology
(capacity) of the WTO.108 However, if the WTO attempts to achieve development goals
by according developing countries rule exemptions in the name of “special and differential
treatment,” it might be counterproductive because it would eventually hurt development
by “discouraging effective efforts to integrate into the world economy.”109
Confronting this risk of identity diffusion, some might argue that the WTO should
never be involved in these regulatory issues.110 Yet, this impulsive reaction tends to usher
in yet another risk of failed identity formation, i.e., “foreclosure.” In other words, the
WTO may be preoccupied by its own “ritualized behavior,” i.e., its pro-trade bias, which is
totally unresponsive and unaccountable to the larger social environment.111 Such
“insulation” from its environment and refusal to process the meaningful information
provided by its environment tend to chip away at its legitimacy, and is thus fatal to the
organization’s survival.112
C. Toward the WTO’s Identity Achievement
The WTO’s identity formation or identity achievement is inseparable from its
recognition of inevitable connectedness to its environment. The WTO is an open system
and not a self-contained regime.113 Granted, the WTO interacts with, responds to, and is
even influenced by its legal environment. Nonetheless, the WTO’s openness as an
organization should not be confused with its autonomy or “autopoietic” status preserving
its legal integrity or “operative closure.”114 In other words, the WTO’s central identity is
as a trade organization and its main concern is the rule of law in the area of international
trade. Other areas of law, such as human rights law or international environmental law,
could and should not become the law of the WTO per se. The WTO may accommodate
these non-trade values by voluntarily “altering” its own internal legal and institutional
choices in the course of its evolution.115 Yet, these non-trade values must not be
“imposed” on the WTO externally as they force the WTO to accept norms and
consequences which are inconsistent with its main identity.116
108
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Therefore, a desirable form of identity formation for the WTO will be to attain an
institutional equilibrium between trade and non-trade (social) regulatory values without
losing its identity as a trade organization. This equilibrium means reconciliation between
trade and social values from the WTO’s perspective as a trade organization. This
reconciliation should be based on, and loyal to, the WTO’s institutional capacity, its core
technology and its own path-dependency. In other words, the agenda should be “trade
and labor or environment” not “labor or environment and trade.” The WTO’s core
technology, such as its software (jurisprudence) and hardware (committees), is capable of
performing such reconciliation.
First of all, via its constructive (teleological) interpretation, the WTO tribunal
can harmonize trade and social values without losing the WTO’s identity. In paradigmatic
cases such as Gasoline (1996)117 and Shrimp-Turtle (1998),118 the WTO tribunal bestowed
on domestic regulators broad discretion in establishing the content of regulations, while it
focused on the manner as to how they were applied.119 This interpretation is teleological in
the sense that it was driven by the WTO’ s new telos, “sustainable development,” which is
nothing but the WTO’s new commitment to a more balanced organizational identity than
the old GATT.
Therefore, these rulings represent a mature departure from the GATT’s narrow
identification with a pro-trade bias, which was tantamount to foreclosure as a failure of
identity formation. In these cases, the WTO no longer dismissed social (human health)
values in a blind pursuit of trade values as in Thai Cigarette. In Shrimp-Turtle, the WTO
tribunal referenced non-trade (environmental) conventions, such as the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES) in an effort to locate a
common ground between the WTO and those environmental treaties.120
Another way of incorporating social values within the WTO without diffusing its
identity is to pursue quasi-harmonization through international standards. Any hard
regulatory bargaining within the WTO that aims for a single undertaking would be
infeasible simply due to the WTO’s lack of core technology in these regulatory areas as
well as its politically combustible nature.121 A more realistic way is to utilize the preexisting hardware, such as the Trade and Environment Committee and the SPS
117
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Committee, to encourage WTO members to tap into relevant international standards.122
These committees, if well operated, can contribute greatly to regulatory dialogue among
WTO members and effectively address the subtle interface between trade and regulatory
issues. At the same time, in this committee process the WTO can co-opt relevant
international regulatory organizations such as the International Organization for
Standardization ("ISO"), the International Electrotechnical Commission ("IEC"), and the
"Codex Alimentarius Commission."
Finally, such reconciliation may also be translated into “coherence” in policymaking between the WTO and other relevant IOs. For example, the World Bank can
help the WTO finance “technical assistance” projects, such as the training of government
officials, to build the regulatory capacity of developing countries.123 The WTO and other
IOs can also perform a joint study that identifies areas of common concerns and interests.
The recent WTO-ILO joint study, “Trade and Employment: Challenges for Policy
Research,” offers a good example in this regard.124 By identifying common interests and
concerns of both organizations as well as defining a relationship between trade and
employment, this type of joint study provides a fertile ground for policy coherence
between trade and non-trade values. Under this nuanced approach, the WTO can
maintain the fidelity to its identity as a trade organization while it still responds to its
increasingly demanding environment.
Importantly, however, the WTO’s identity achievement may come with a price.
The identity achievement as an institutional equilibrium is determined by a confluence of
two forces, i.e., trade values represented by effectiveness as a trade organization, and nontrade values represented by responsiveness to external demands. (Graph A) When the
WTO’s responsiveness increases, e.g., when the WTO spends more resources on nontrade values, the WTO’s overall output tends to decrease even if its identity may be
formed at an increased degree of linkage. (Graph B).125 This is the price the WTO pays to
be responsive. Therefore, the WTO’s own institutional capacity should be beefed up with
more inputs to maintain its output level despite the increased responsiveness. (Graph C).
In this context, the WTO should be equipped with more resources and investment in the
so-called new areas created under the Uruguay Round, such as TRIPS, as well as more
recently designated area under the Doha round, development, as long as it wants to
maintain a decent output level as a trade organization while it can still be responsive to
these non-trade or trade-related values.

122

See Sungjoon Cho, Linkage of Free Trade and Social Regulation: Moving Beyond the Entropic Dilemma, 6
CHI. J. INT’L L. 625 (2005).
123
Sampson, 265
124
WTO & ILO, Trade and Employment: Challenges for Policy Research (2007).
125
Cf. Manfred Elsig, The World Trade Organization’s Legitimacy Crisis: What Does the Beast Look Like?,
41 J. World Trade 75, 79-80 (2007)(warning that the WTO’s institutional redesign to meet concerns of
legitimate governance could lead to hampered output efficiency).

20

As of March 15, 2007

Output
Effectiveness (E)

Responsiveness (R)

Degree of Linkage
ID Formation

Graph A
Output
E

R

R¹

O
O¹

Degree of Linkage
ID

ID¹

Graph B

21

As of March 15, 2007
Output
E¹

R

E

O¹
O

Degree of Linkage
ID

ID¹

Graph C

V. Conclusion
This Article argues that an IO, like a human being, is prone to the process of identity
formation based on its autonomy from its members (states). As it undergoes various
institutional changes, its old identifications with certain goals or functions may encounter
a new set of identifications with other goals or functions and thus experience confusion as
to its true identity (identity crisis). An IO can achieve a consistent and coherent
institutional self (identity) by striking a balance among these multiple identifications
under its parameters, such as its environment and technology. Yet, an IO may also fail to
achieve its identity by insulating itself from its environment (foreclosure) or being adrift
in the middle of these multiple identifications without making any commitments to a final
identity (identity diffusion).
Admittedly, this Article offers little explanation on a microscopic internal dynamics as to
how social actors (states) of an IO influence its identity formation process. This should be
tackled by a future research agenda, which will engage more actively conventional IR
theories in an attempt to build a more comprehensive, or universal, theory of IOs’
institutional changes.
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